By Andrea Caropreso
Index
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For a while, we had almost forgotten about them, but in reality, they never went away. Turkish clubs, especially Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe, are ready to challenge football in Europe’s top five leagues. How? By offering almost unmatched salaries to attract many stars (some at the end of their careers, others not) under the shadow of Istanbul’s Blue Mosque. However, there is something in this story that has yet to fully emerge. And it also involves politics.
The context
“Who wants to watch the Turkish league abroad? They have the Premier League, Ligue 1, the Bundesliga, the Portuguese league, the Eredivisie. Why would they watch this league? I didn’t even watch it before. I only started when they invited me to come to Turkey.” These were the words of José Mourinho, coach of Fenerbahçe, after an unsatisfactory result in the last season, which he blamed on multiple refereeing errors.
However, if we set aside the Portuguese coach’s thoughts for a moment, we can see how Turkey is positioning itself as the new frontier of European football. Galatasaray, for example, historic rival of Fenerbahçe, has just secured Victor Osimhen for €75 million from Napoli. The Nigerian will earn €16 million per season, adding to the €9 million guaranteed to Leroy Sané, recently released from Bayern. Mourinho himself, who had been on a slight decline in his last experiences in the top 5 leagues, managed to sign a contract with Fenerbahçe worth €10.5 million (a full €3 million more than Antonio Conte, fresh off his triumph in Naples). But what is really behind these lavish expenses?
Political maneuvers: the case of Galatasaray
In Turkey, clubs do not belong to a single owner but are rather multi-sport associations that also manage franchises and the brand in other sports, such as basketball. In Galatasaray’s case, ownership belongs to Galatasaray Sportive Joint-Stock Company, a company made up of members who are also investors in the club and who periodically elect the president.
The strong pressure placed on the elected president to triumph over rivals has led Turkey’s major clubs, including Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, Trabzonspor, and Galatasaray itself, to become heavily indebted in the past. This Pandora’s box was opened during the pandemic crisis of 2020. Presidents, in order to be re-elected, would acquire players—often at the end of their careers—by overpaying them and leaving the debts to their successors, who in turn would perpetuate this vicious cycle.
Turkish football was saved by the government of President Erdoğan. Through Turkish banks, the debts of various clubs were refinanced, and for a period, top teams had to embrace austerity. However, since 2023, things have returned to how they were before.
The role of sponsorships
Unable to rely on major income from TV rights or player sales, Turkish clubs have leaned heavily on sponsorship deals. Taking Galatasaray as an example again, it has emerged that Sixt, a car rental company, will inject €100 million into the club’s coffers until 2028. This money is supplemented by SOCAR (an Azerbaijani energy company), which pays €15 million to be the club’s sponsor in international matches, and Rams Global, a construction company that also renamed the stadium (formerly Turk Telekom Arena due to another sponsorship deal with the telecommunications giant).
Thanks to this business model, Galatasaray is trying to monopolize Turkish football, positioning itself as the new El Dorado of European football. Its historic rival, Fenerbahçe, is the only club keeping up by adopting similar tactics to remain competitive. Fenerbahçe’s latest sponsorship deal will bring in €100 million over five years from Turkish-American food company Chobani, making it one of the most lucrative deals in Turkish sports history.
However, even in light of this, the remaining question is: can this model reshape the hierarchies of European football? Most likely not, because in the long run, Turkish clubs’ inability to generate consistent revenues to sustain this business model could once again lead to a sea of debt, as happened in 2019.
