By Andrea Caropreso
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It might sound paradoxical, but in the last five years, the times Paris Saint-Germain managed to advance past the Round of 16 in the Champions League were those when the dream trio of Messi-Mbappe-Neymar was not present. A coincidence? Maybe. Or maybe the truth is that even the football gods have rebelled against the business model of the Parisian club, which, since the start of the Al Khelaifi era, has raised more than a few doubts regarding financial management.
The “PSG model”
How many times have we wondered how PSG could afford to pay ultra-millionaire salaries and spend astronomical sums on transfer fees? The answer lies in an acronym: QSI — Qatar Sports Investment. This holding company, based in Doha, Qatar, owns the majority stake in the wealthy PSG. It was in 2011 that Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, through the state-run organization, acquired 70% of the Parisian club.
A year later, the remaining 30% was acquired, effectively placing the club entirely in the hands of the Qatari state (although in 2023 a small portion was sold to the Arctos fund). What followed was a business model that allowed PSG to increase its revenue by 700%, but also its expenses by 640%.
Over the years, the club has reached astonishing records not only in sports. While it has dominated Ligue 1, it also reached a record in player wages: €728 million in the season of the star trio. All seemingly regular—if not for a regulation called Financial Fair Play, which smaller and less wealthy clubs must strictly follow but that PSG has managed to circumvent for years.
How Financial Fair Play works
To give a concrete example: a club over three years should avoid exceeding €60 million in losses. If it does, it may face sanctions ranging from hefty fines to exclusion from UEFA competitions. It’s common to see clubs being forced to sell valuable players to close their balance sheet by June 30 either with minimal losses or balanced books.
Recently, UEFA has partially revised the system—softening the break-even rule and introducing a spending cap for players and coaches, calculated on club revenue: 90% in the 2023/24 season, 80% in 2024/25, and 70% in 2025/26.
PSG and FFP: a questionable relationship
In theory, the law should be the same for everyone, but many doubts have arisen regarding PSG (and others) in recent years. From Neymar’s €222 million transfer to the astronomical costs of acquiring Mbappe and signing Lionel Messi—there are many unanswered questions.
Analyzing the 2020–2025 period, PSG has accumulated significant losses: €124 million in the COVID year and €109 million last season. Yet they keep spending—around €160 million last summer alone. The way this is possible is thanks to the previously mentioned acronym: QSI.
Qatar Sports Investment, through sponsorship contracts like Qatar Airways and massive capital increases, allows PSG to register sufficient funds in its (often unpublished) accounts to cover the losses. In this way, the club appears to maintain a healthy cost-revenue ratio. From 2011 to 2024, there have been three capital increases and four cash injections (the last one in 2023 for €270 million), effectively helping PSG bypass the rules—amounting to nearly €1 billion in 13 years.
Until now, UEFA has largely turned a blind eye, issuing fines of at most €10 million—peanuts compared to the many irregularities mentioned. In the last two years, the club has started a seemingly more “virtuous” path, parting ways with its superstar wages and focusing on young talents, some from its academy. Is this the start of a new chapter? Difficult, but possible.
By Andrea Caropreso
